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Abstract—We explore the use of clock skew of a wireless local area network access point (AP) as its fingerprint to detect unauthorized 
APs quickly and accurately. The main goal behind using clock skews is to overcome one of the major limitations of existing 
solutions—the inability to effectively detect Medium Access Control (MAC) address spoofing. We calculate the clock skew of an AP 
from the IEEE 802.11 Time Synchronization Function (TSF) time stamps sent out in the beacon/probe response frames. We use two 
different methods for this purpose—one based on linear programming and the other based on least-square fit. We supplement these 
methods with a heuristic for differentiating original packets from those sent by the fake APs. We collect TSF time stamp data from 
several APs in three different residential settings. Using our measurement data as well as data obtained from a large conference 
setting, we find that clock skews remain consistent over time for the same AP but vary significantly across APs. Furthermore, we 
improve the resolution of received time stamp of the frames and show that with this enhancement, our methodology can find clock 
skews very quickly, using 50-100 packets in most of the cases. We also discuss and quantify the impact of various external factors 
including temperature variation, virtualization, clock source selection, and NTP synchronization on clock skews. Our results indicate 
that the use of clock skews appears to be an efficient and robust method for detecting fake APs in wireless local area networks.
Index Terms—IEEE 802.11, fingerprint, MAC address spoofing, fake access point, time stamp.
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1 Introduction
With advances in microtechnology and wireless net­works, networked mobile systems are becoming increasingly prevalent. There is also an ever growing 
demand for ubiquitous services. These two factors are 
fueling a wide-scale deployment of wireless networks 
including the IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networks. 
However, because of their importance in providing ubiqui­
tous services and their inherent vulnerability due to 
broadcast nature of the wireless medium, the wireless local 
area networks (WLANs) are also becoming targets of a 
variety of attacks. One of the ways in which a WLAN can be 
attacked is by introducing one or more unauthorized fake 
Access Points (APs) in the network [1], [2], [3], [4], A fake 
AP can be set up by a malicious attacker (Fig. 1) to 
masquerade as an authorized AP by spoofing the author­
ized AP's medium access control (MAC) address. This fake 
AP is used to fool a wireless node in the WLAN into 
accessing the network through the fake AP instead of the 
authorized one. The fake AP can then launch a variety of 
attacks thereby compromising the security of the wireless 
communication. Setting up fake APs is not hard. Public 
domain programs including rghieap [5] sniff 802.11 probe 
request frames to find out the default AP of the probing 
wireless node, and then, impersonate the default AP.
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Therefore, detecting unauthorized APs is a very important 
task of WLAN intrusion detection systems (WIDSs).
The new wireless security enhancement 802.l l i  RSNA 
(Robust Security Network Association) uses traditional 
cryptographic methods (i.e., digital certificates) to provide 
strong mutual authentication between wireless clients and 
the APs. Although this solution, if implemented properly, 
will make the fake AP attack less likely, the following 
practical issues can still make wireless networks using 
802.11i RSNA vulnerable. First, management and verifica­
tion of digital certificates across different domains are 
known to be cumbersome. Second, as the current AP 
selection algorithms use signal strength as the only criteria 
for AP selection, users can be fooled to connect to the fake 
AP that has a higher signal strength compared to the 
original one but does not support any security measures 
such as RSNA.1 Third, an attacker can also set up fake APs 
having the same identifiers (MAC address, basic service set 
identifier (BSSID) and service set identifier (SSID)) as the 
original AP and evade detection by using different physical 
channel characteristics (by using short/long preambles, 
operating in a different channel, etc.). These facts motivate 
us to find a viable noncryptographic solution to the fake AP 
attack. We emphasize that this solution is not meant to 
replace existing cryptographic methods. Rather, it should 
be used in conjunction with the cryptographic methods to 
achieve a higher level of security in WLANs. The current 
state-of-the-art noncrypto methods for unauthorized AP 
detection [1], [7], [3], [8], [4] cannot detect fake APs.
In this paper, we explore a passive online scheme that can 
detect fake APs with high accuracy and minimum overhead.
1. This security rollback/downgrade attack is possible in 802.11i RSNA 
networks [6],
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Fig. 1. A fake AP attack scenario.
This scheme, like the one proposed by Kohno et al. for 
fingerprinting personal computers and servers [9], is based 
on estimating clock skews of APs. An AP's clock skew acts 
as its fingerprint. Kohno and coauthors [9], [10] have shown 
that the clock skew of a device remains fairly consistent over 
time but the clock skews vary significantly across devices 
thereby arguing that the clock skew of a device can be used 
as its reliable fingerprint. However, Kohno's scheme 
focused on wide-area wired networks. Its application in a 
local area setting can result in higher accuracy. Unlike 
Kohno's scheme that uses TCP/ICMP time stamps, in our 
scheme, we use the Time Synchronization Function (TSF) 
time stamps in the IEEE 802.11 beacon/probe response 
messages sent by the AP, to determine its clock skew. The 
use of beacons has several advantages. First, beacons are 
sent all the time and at a fast rate (typically, 10 to 100 frames 
per second) independent of any application. Second, the 
granularity of 802.11 TSF timer is 1 microsecond which is 
much higher than that of TCP time stamp clocks. Third, as 
the beacon time stamp is the actual time when an AP sends a 
frame (i.e., the time after the channel is sensed to be free) 
rather than the time when it is scheduled to send the frame, 
we do not need to consider any significant unpredictable 
delays incurred by the network as in the case of TCP time 
stamps. Therefore, our scheme estimates more accurate 
clock skews and much faster compared to the TCP/ICMP 
time stamp approach [9]. We also improve upon the time 
taken for estimating the clock skew by using high-precision 
timers, at the fingerprinting node, that have resolutions in 
the order of microseconds to measure the arrival time of 
beacon frames.
We examine two different methods for estimating the 
clock skew of an AP. Our first method is based on the linear 
programming approach, first proposed by Moon et al. [11] 
and later used by Kohno et al. [9]. This method finds a line 
that upper bounds all the time offsets calculated from the 
time stamps in the AP beacons and the time of arrival of 
those beacons at fingerprinting node. The slope of this line 
is our clock skew estimate. Our second method is based on 
finding a line that is at the least-square distance from all the 
time offsets. The slope of the line represents our estimate of 
clock skew. As we show later in Section 5, both of these 
methods perform their tasks fairly well. However, in the 
special case when the frames transmitted by the fake AP are 
interspersed with the frames transmitted from the author­
ized AP that is being faked, both of these methods fail to 
determine clock skews accurately. These methods are not
even designed to handle this scenario. To achieve separa­
tion of frames with the same identifiers but from different 
APs, we develop a novel heuristic for differentiating frames 
sent by the fake AP and the authorized one that is being 
faked. Our heuristic exploits differences both in the beacon 
time stamp values of different APs as well as the different 
rate of increment of those values. We also use our clock- 
skew-based fingerprinting technique in a wireless ad hoc 
setting to identify individual nodes but find that it is very 
difficult to estimate a node's clock skew accurately in this 
setting because of periodic clock synchronization among 
the nodes.
For our experimentation and evaluation, we implement 
our methodology on laptops running Linux and measure 
the clock skews of a wide range of APs from different 
manufacturers in three different residential settings. We 
also use WLAN traces from the 2004 ACM Sigcomm 
conference to compute the clock skews of the APs used at 
the conference venue. From our experiments, we find that 
an AP's clock skew remains consistent over time but the 
clock skew varies across APs. Therefore, an AP's clock 
skew can be used as its fingerprint. In our WLAN setting 
with predictable beacon delays and high-resolution time 
stamps, we can find clock skews very quickly, using 50- 
100 packets in most cases. We also discuss and quantify 
the impact of various external factors including tempera­
ture variation, virtualization, and NTP synchronization on 
clock skew. Very importantly, we also explore the 
possibility of engineering clock skews to allow a fake AP 
to generate the clock skew of the original one. Our 
exploration results indicate that the use of clock skews 
appears to be an efficient and robust method for detecting 
fake APs in WLANs.
In a real deployment, we expect our methodology to be 
implemented on the WIDS nodes. In order to verify 
whether or not an AP is genuine, a WIDS node can 
compute the clock skew of the AP and compare with the 
precomputed clock skew of the AP with the same identity 
(e.g., MAC address).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 
describes the threat model that we address in this paper. We 
describe our clock skew estimation methodology in Section 3. 
Section 4 contains a description of our implementation, and 
Section 5 contains our experimental results. Fabrication of 
clock skews is discussed in Section 6. In Section 7, we explore 
the utility of our scheme in wireless ad hoc networks to 
identify participating devices uniquely. We survey the 
existing work on detecting unauthorized APs in Section 8. 
We conclude the paper in Section 9 by summarizing our 
work and indicating directions for future work.
2 Threat  Model
An adversary can set up an unauthorized AP to masquer­
ade as an authorized one.
There are two scenarios in which a fake AP can operate:
•  The fake AP and the authorized AP that is being 
faked are both active at the same time. As the current 
AP selection mechanisms use signal strength as the 
only selection criteria, the user will select the fake
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AP if he measures the fake AP's signal strength to be 
higher than the original AP.
•  Only the fake AP is active and the authorized AP 
being faked is inactive. This can happen when the 
authorized AP has failed on its own or due to a 
Denial-of-Service attack from the adversary, or when 
the user moves to a location where only the fake AP 
is reachable. The adversary can facilitate this by 
tracking and following the user.
In our threat model, the adversary is powerful enough to 
modify any of the MAC address, BSSID, and SSID fields of 
any frame he wants. The adversary can also capture, collect, 
and analyze any amount of data without being detected 
even before actually trying to break into the network. If the 
packets are sent across the network in encrypted form, the 
adversary can gather enough packets needed to launch 
password guessing attacks. It can also decrypt the packets 
once it succeeds in guessing the password.
Our methodology will address the detection of unauthor­
ized APs in all these cases. As our method is based on a 
physical characteristics of the AP (i.e., the clock skew), it can 
detect MAC, BSSID, and SSID spoofing, whether the 
authorized AP is active or not. We expect the clock-skew- 
based methodology to be deployed in the WIDS nodes for 
detecting unauthorized APs in WLANs. We assume that the 
adversary cannot break into WIDS nodes. We also assume 
that the attacker does not have access to any custom 
hardware that can generate fake time stamps at a very fine 
granularity. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 6.
3 M et hodology
In an IEEE 802.11 infrastructure WLAN, there are two 
methods that a client station (STA) may use to find an AP in 
the WLAN [12].
•  Active scanning: The STA sends a probe request 
frame to determine which APs are within range. The 
APs in the vicinity then reply back with probe 
response frames.
•  Passive scanning: The STA learns about the APs in 
the WLAN by listening to the beacon frames 
broadcast by the APs.
The probe response and the beacon frames both have an
8 byte time stamp. The time stamp field contains the value 
of TSF timer of the AP when it sends the frame. The beacons 
are scheduled to be sent at periodic intervals by the APs. 
The time stamps in the beacon frames do not get affected by 
the random medium access delays of the wireless medium 
as hardware sets the time stamp value just before actual 
transmission. The TSF timer is a 64 bit timer which is 
initialized at the time of starting the AP and incremented 
once every microsecond.
Our solution uses TSF time stamps in beacon/probe 
response frames to estimate the clock skew of an AP and 
uses the clock skew as the AP's fingerprint. An access 
point's (or regular computer's) clock consists of primarily 
two parts:
•  Oscillator: An oscillator is controlled by a crystal 
and it ticks at a fixed frequency.
•  Counter: A counter keeps track of the number of 
ticks produced by the oscillator.
The exact frequency of a crystal depends primarily on the 
type of the crystal and the angle at which the crystal was 
cut relative to its axes. However, in reality, even two 
crystals of the same type and the same cut will have slightly 
different frequencies due to the limited mechanical accu­
racy of the cutting process [13]. This is the primary reason 
behind the existence of clock skew even between seemingly 
similar clocks.
Let us assume that a fingerprinter node (a WIDS node) 
has received n beacon frames from a particular AP. Let the 
time stamp in the /'th beacon frame be T, and let t-, be the 
time in microsecond when the fingerprinter receives the zth 
beacon frame. Let Si be the size of the /th beacon frame and 
Ri be the data rate at which /'th beacon frame is sent. 
Therefore, the time, according to the AP's clock, when the 
fingerprinter receives the packet is T, + Si / R,. Let our 
estimated offset for the /th frame be denoted o; and the time 
difference between the first received frame and the zth 
frame according to the fingerprinter's clock be x, . Then,
Xi = ti - h, (1)
Oi = {{T + Si/Ri) - {Tl + Si/Ri)) - (ti - tl). (2)
In most of the cases, the beacon frames are sent at a 
fixed-data rate and the size of the beacon frames remain 
fixed as well [12]. So, we can assume that S;/R, = S\ /R.\. 
This yields,
oi = (T - Ti) - (ti - ti). (3)
Now, if the clock skew of a particular device remains 
constant and if we plot (x.j, o,j, we will get an approximately 
linear pattern. The clock skew can be estimated as the slope 
of this linear pattern. Let us call the set of points 
(.i'i. o\ ), ,  (x„. on) the clock offset-set of the AP.
We evaluate two different methods for estimating the 
clock skew from the offset-set—a linear-programming- 
based method (LPM) that was proposed in [11] and later 
used by [9] and a least-square fit (LSF) method.
3.1 Linear Programming Method (LPM)
LPM finds a line Sx + <f>, where 6 is the slope of the line and 
<I> is the y-axis intercept, that upper bounds the points in the 
clock offset-set of the AP and outputs the slope of the line, 8, 
as the clock skew estimate. So, our clock skew estimation 8 
is such that Vi = 1 ... n
S.Xi + (f) > Oi, (4)
and the following function is minimized:
n
1/ U■ ^ 2 ( S-Xi + (t) ~ °i)- (5)
i=1
This problem can be solved using linear programming 
methods for two variables.
The LPM method minimizes the effect of any unpre­
dictable delays as it has higher tolerance toward outliers. 
The clock skew estimate remains stable even if there is 
significant number of outliers. However, in our case, the
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number of outliers is very less because no significant 
random delay is involved in the communication path and 
the TSF clocks have a higher precision than TCP time 
stamp clocks.
Interestingly, LPM's nature to tolerate the outliers may 
cause a serious security problem in our context. If an 
adversary is able to mix small number of beacons from a 
fake AP with the beacons of the authorized one, it is faking, 
and if the clock skew of the fake AP is close to the clock 
skew of authorized one, then this method might consider 
the fake AP frames as outliers and estimate the clock skew 
of the authorized AP as the clock skew of the set. In this 
case, it will be difficult to detect the fake AP by comparing 
the clock skews.
3.2 Least-Square Fitting (LSF)
We can also use LSF to estimate the clock skew of an AP 
from its clock offset-set. Given an offset-set (x\,o\
(xn, on), LSF finds a line 6x + <p, where 6 is the slope of the 
line and <j> is the y-axis intercept such that
n
- (S.Xi + (f>))2 (6)
2=1
remains minimum. The slope of the line 6 is estimated as 
the clock skew of the clock offset-set.
One of the major differences of LSF from LPM is its lack 
of tolerance toward outliers. Even if there are only a very 
few outliers, the clock skew estimated by LSF will vary 
significantly from the clock skew determined by the 
majority of the points. This can cause problems while 
estimating clock skew from noisy data. Kohno et al. [9] 
decided not to use LSF for estimation of TCP clock skew 
because TCP segments can undergo random delays in the 
network which can affect the accuracy of the clock skew 
estimate. However, as mentioned earlier, in our case, the 
absence of any unpredictable delays makes the number of 
outliers insignificant. Therefore, we can use the LSF to 
estimate clock skews effectively. LSF has an advantage over 
LPM in the scenario where an adversary tries to avoid 
detection by interspersing frames from a fake AP with the 
frames from the authorized one as described above. LSF's 
sensitivity to the presence of even a small number of 
outliers will help determining the fake AP in the above 
scenario more effectively than LPM. So, it will be difficult 
for the adversary to masquerade frames from the fake AP as 
outlying data when LSF is used to estimate the clock skew.
We measure and compare the effectiveness of these two 
methods in estimating clock skews in Section 5.
3.3 Differentiating Frames of Fake APs
Separation of the clock offset-sets of the fake AP(s) and the 
authorized AP (if present) helps us to gain insight about the 
fake APs. For example, if the attacker uses multiple fake 
APs to fake one authorized AP, we can detect the fake APs 
by separating the clock offset-sets.
The general problem of fitting multiple lines to a data set 
is not new. In the domain of computer vision and image 
processing, Generalized Hough Transform (GHT) [14], [15] 
is a well-known technique that can be used for this purpose. 
However, the main drawback of GHT is that it is
computationally intensive and requires a large amount of 
storage. Even though techniques like Randomized Hough 
Transform (RHT) [16] try to minimize these effects, the time 
required by these techniques is still quite high. The use of 
GHT is justified in the domain of image processing and 
computer graphics because images normally contain large 
number of edges and GHT can detect all of them together. 
However, in our case, we expect to have very few lines.
Another approach to solve the problem of fitting multi­
ple lines to a data set is to model the data as a mixture 
model and apply the well-known statistical method of 
expectation maximization (EM) to separate the data [17]. 
However, the EM algorithm requires the initial parameters 
to be guessed and the accuracy of the results depends on 
the values of these initial parameters. Furthermore, EM 
requires multiple iterations to converge.
We note that the complexities and the computation 
intensiveness of these algorithms arise from their attempt to 
solve a general problem without any domain-specific 
assumptions. In our problem domain, we have some 
specific characteristics of the data that help us to create a 
less complex and lightweight solution. We know the 
following facts about the clock offset-sets:
•  The thickness of the lines in the clock offset-set plot 
(i.e., the variance of the points in the set) remains 
mostly constant across the APs.
•  The amount of noise in the data is negligible. 
Keeping these facts in mind and borrowing ideas from both 
of the aforementioned methods, we design a lightweight 
heuristic that solves our problem efficiently.
Our heuristic relies on the fact that if a clock offset-set is 
calculated from the beacons received from different APs, 
then the clock offset-set will contain certain jumps (i.e., 
sudden big changes in the value) at the boundary where 
one packet is from one AP and the successive packet is from 
another AP. Our heuristic identifies these jumps and 
differentiates the data based on it.
We exploit this fact to differentiate packets from different 
APs. Let Aij be the relative skew between two samples in the 
clock offset-set (x^ y-,) and (Xj,yj). Ay is defined as follows:
A ij = | y% — yj\/\xi — Xj |, (7)
where |a; is the absolute value of x.
We introduce a tunable parameter called threshold to 
differentiate between jump and consistent increment. Thus, 
two consecutive points (x^yi) and (Xj,yj) in the clock 
offset-set are considered to be a jump if and only if 
A > threshold. Using this definition of jump, we can 
segregate the clock offset-set data into separate groups 
based on the jumps taken.
In Algorithm 1, threshold is the only parameter that can 
be and must be tuned. A limit can also be imposed on the 
count field to filter out small number of outliers that are not 
part of any data set. However, we do not expect the WLAN 
samples to contain outliers that are not part of any sample, 
and hence, we do not set any limit on or tune the count 
field. The value of threshold can be estimated empirically 
from the clock offset-set of a single AP. Algorithm 2 
describes the algorithm for finding the threshold value from 
the test data.
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Algorithm 1. Separate clock offset-set points based on 
originating AP
accumulator[0].dataset ■<= [(xi,yi)] 
accumulator [0\.current-point -4= (x\,y\) 
accumulator[0\.current-offset ■<= 1 
accumulator [0].count 1 
for * = 2 to n do 
for each entry j  in accumulator do 
k -4= accumulator[j].current-offset 
if A,-/. < threshold then
add (x, , !]; ) to data set of accumulator entry j  
accumulator[j\.count ■<= accumulator\j].count + 
1
accumulator\j\. current -point -4= (xi,yi) 
accumulator[j].current-offset •<= i 
end if 
end for
if none of the entry in accumulator satisfies
(Aik < threshold) then 
add a new accumulator entry p
p.dataset -4= [(a?*,?/*)] 
p.count <= 1
p.current-point ■<= (xi,yi) 
p.current-off set <= i 
end if 
end for
output number of entries in accumulator as number of 
different data sets 
output the data sets of accumulator entries as different 
data sets from the APs
Algorithm 2. Calculate threshold from test clock offset-set 
finalthreshold 0 
for each test data set do 
threshold ■<= A 12 
for i = 3 to n do
if > threshold then
threshold •<= A,;(j_!) 
end if 
end for
if threshold > finalthreshold then 
finalthreshold •<= threshold 
end if 
end for
output finalthreshold as final calculated threshold
We estimate the threshold using the above algorithm from 
different test data sets. We find that the threshold estimated 
from a very small amount of data (i.e., 50-100 packets 
depending on the received time stamp resolution) is enough 
to separate a wide variety of data sets. From our experi­
mental results, we find that the threshold value depends on 
the fingerprinter as well as on the AP which is being 
fingerprinted. However, these variations are very small 
compared to the variations in relative skew caused by mixing 
beacons from different APs. Our results suggest that we can 
use the same threshold to separate beacon packets from 
diverse set of APs. Our results also show that the value of 
threshold estimated by the test data depends on the method 
we use to generate the receiver's time stamps. For example, if
we use our modified Mad Wifi driver, described later in 
Section 4, then the threshold is estimated as 0.003, whereas if 
we use jiffies2 to estimate the time stamp, then the value of 
threshold becomes 0.05.
Once the data sets are separated using the above 
heuristic, we can use either LPM- or LSF-based methods 
to estimate the exact clock skew of different fake APs.
4 Implementation
We implement our methodology for capturing beacon 
frames, recording time stamps, and computing clock skews 
of APs, presented in the last section, on two laptops—an 
Acer TravelMate 2303 NLC running Ubuntu Linux 7.4 and 
an Acer Aspire running SUSE Linux 10.1. We use two 
wireless cards—a Linksys WPC 55AG and a Intel PRO/ 
Wireless 3945ABG. The Linksys card uses an Atheros chipset 
that works with the Mad Wifi driver. We chose these cards 
because they both support the monitor mode and also 
because their drivers are open source. The availability of the 
source code allows us to modify the drivers to measure the 
arrival time of beacon frames with higher resolution as 
described below. As the success of our methodology is 
closely tied to how precisely we can measure time, most of 
our implementation effort targets obtaining high-precision 
time measurements and we will focus on this very aspect of 
our implementation in the rest of this section.
In order to accurately estimate the clock skew of an AP, 
we need to precisely measure the time when a beacon frame 
reaches the wireless LAN card of the fingerprinter. We will 
now describe and discuss three different mechanisms that 
we explore for the purpose of accurately measuring the 
arrival time of a beacon frame at the fingerprinter. We first 
explore the use of sniffers such as tcpdump [18], to find the 
arrival time of a frame. Even though this mechanism does 
not require any changes in the system, we note that the time 
stamp generated by tcpdump includes variable processing 
time of the operating system. Therefore, use of tcpdump 
time stamp is not suitable for our purpose.
Next, we explore using the Prism monitoring headers in 
the MadWifi driver [19] and the Intel 3945ABG driver [20]. 
These drivers allow additional Prism monitoring headers to 
be added to frames arriving at the wireless card which has 
a 4-byte time stamp field. The drivers use it to report the 
time when the packet is received by the wireless cards. 
However, we find that the precision of the time reported by 
MadWifi is not accurate enough to detect the clock skew 
quickly and accurately. In Linux, MadWifi driver puts the 
current value of the jiffies variable in the time stamp field. 
jiffies is a counter incremented at regular intervals by the 
Linux kernel through timer interrupts. By default, it is 
incremented once every 4 ms in recent Linux kernels 
(newer than 2.6.13). This interval is a configurable para­
meter that can also be set to 1 ms or 10 ms [21]. Therefore, 
the highest resolution available for incrementing jiffies in 
Linux is 1 ms. Making the jiffies counter arbitrarily small is 
not desirable because the number of timer interrupts being 
invoked per second depends on this value and will increase
1. jiffies is a variable maintained and incremented once in every 4 ms by 
the Linux kernel.
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significantly. High timer interrupt overhead can lead to 
unstable system behavior. Now, as noted before in Section 3, 
the TSF counter in the AP is incremented once every 
microsecond. Therefore, the clock skew of an AP cannot be 
estimated quickly and accurately with a 1 ms precision 
clock at fingerprinter's end.
The 1 ms resolution limitation of jiffies leads us to explore 
a third mechanism. Here, our goal is to use a microsecond 
precision time stamp. However, a microsecond precision 
time stamp will quickly overflow a 4 byte field that the 
Prism header allows and has room for. To deal with this 
problem, we use another header called the Radiotap header 
that has an 8 byte time stamp field. Normally, when the 
Mad Wifi or the IPW 3945 ABG drivers receive a frame, the 
current value of the TSF timer of the fingerprinter is stored 
in the time stamp field of the Radiotap header [19], [20]. 
Both these drivers maintain a microsecond resolution TSF 
timer. However, this TSF timer is synchronized to the time 
stamps of the received beacon frames. Therefore, it cannot 
be used for an accurate measurement of the clock skew. We 
modify both the drivers to call do_gettimeofday, which 
supports microsecond resolution, each time a frame is 
received and stores the time stamp in the 8 byte time stamp 
field of the Radiotap header. We show in Section 5 that 
using this improvement clock skews can be estimated 
accurately by examining 50-100 packets in most of the cases. 
We end this section by analyzing the overheads caused by 
our monitoring scheme.
The use of do_gettimeofday in our scheme does not add 
any significant performance overhead because time stamps 
are recorded only when a wireless card is in the monitor 
mode and the Radiotap headers are enabled. Moreover, we 
also introduce an ioctl system call to turn this feature on or 
off allowing us to turn off this feature when we are not 
measuring clock skews. As the packet capture for measur­
ing skew only takes small amount of time (2-3 minutes), the 
overhead due to enabling this feature only for that duration 
is not significant.
5 Experim ental R esults
We use experimental traces from two very different settings 
to test our methodology for detecting unauthorized APs. 
Our first set of traces is from data collected during the ACM 
Sigcomm 2004 conference [22], The Sigcomm conference 
network comprised 5 different APs. Five PCs, each with 
three Netgear WAG 311 wireless adapters, were used for 
wireless sniffing. The details of the data collection settings 
can be found in [22]. As the Sigcomm data set represents a 
heavily used 802.11 wireless network, we use it to estimate 
the number of frames needed to estimate the clock skew 
accurately in a loaded network. Kohno et al. [9] performed 
extensive measurements to show that clock skews of 
networked devices remained consistent over a long time. 
Our main goal here is to verify that this observation holds in 
case of APs as well, and estimate how quickly and 
accurately we can estimate the clock skew of APs.
We obtain our second set of traces by collecting wireless 
data in three different residential settings each with multi­
ple APs operating simultaneously. One residential setting 
(residential setting A) has 8 APs and two other ones
TABLE 1
Skew Estimates for Samples (Collected by Chihuahua) 
with Different Sample Sizes
Packets examined skew(using LPM) skew(using LSF)
100 49.36 ppm 42.73 ppm
200 50.69 ppm 46.14 ppm
300 51.21 ppm 47.98 ppm
400 51.21 ppm 48.42 ppm
500 51.21 ppm 49.06 ppm
600 51.21 ppm 49.32 ppm
The samples contain beacon frames sent by sigcomm-nat.
(residential setting B and residential setting C) have 21 APs 
and 12 APs, respectively, from different manufacturers. We 
use two laptops that implement our measurement metho­
dology, as described in the last section, to collect the packet 
traces. We collect the packet traces on multiple days in same 
residential settings to verify the consistency of AP clock 
skews over time.
We use the measure parts per million, essentially fis/s, 
denoted as ppm, to quantify clock skew. We describe the 
results of our experiments with the Sigcomm and the 
residential traces in the following sections.
5.1 Results from the Sigcomm Trace
Each packet in the Sigcomm traces has a prism header 
which contains receive time stamp of that packet. As stated 
in Section 4, the time stamps in Prism headers are in terms 
of jiffies. We also note in Section 4 that the resolution 
obtained with jiffies is in milliseconds.3 Therefore, the 
Sigcomm data do not contain very precise time measure­
ments in comparison to the data we collect with micro­
second resolution. However, the Sigcomm data can still be 
used for estimating clock skews, albeit using more samples.
First, to check the consistency of the AP clock skew over 
time, we create 20 equal sized sample data sets by selecting 
blocks of packets starting from random offset from the trace 
collected by the machine chihuahua and measure the clock 
skew of a particular AP, with SSID sigcomm-nat, for each 
data set. We find that the clock skew estimate remains 
around 51.25 ppm (using LPM) and between 51.09 and 
51.37 ppm (using LSF) for each of the sets. This reaffirms 
that the clock skew of an AP remains consistent over time. 
Next, we try to figure out the speed of convergence of our 
procedure, i.e., what is the minimum number of packets 
that we need to examine to get a close skew estimate. We 
start with the skew estimates for the first 100 packets, and 
then, increment the number of packets by 100 and measure 
the clock skew in each of the cases. The skew estimate 
results are shown in Table 1.
As can be seen in Table 1, the minimum number of 
packets needed to converge to a clock skew is 300 (using 
LPM). However, when we use LSF, even 600 packets are not 
enough to converge to a small range of clock skews. In fact, 
900 packets (not shown in the table) are required to 
converge to the 51.09-51.37 range. Later, we will show in
3. As the Sigcomm trace was collected in 2004 (when 2.4 Linux kernels 
were latest ones), we assume that the resolution of jiffies is 10 ms. However, 
this assumption does not have any effect on the consistency of an AP clock 
skew or on the comparison between the clock skews of different APs. It only 
helps us in estimating absolute values of the skews which are easier to 
comprehend than comparing them using their ratio.
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Fig. 2. Skew estimates of samples containing 300 packets taken at 
different times by chihuahua. The samples contain beacon frames sent 
by sigcomm-nat.
Section 5.2 that LSF can also estimate clock skews accurately 
using the same number of packets as LPM if we use the 
higher resolution receiver time stamps. To verify if the clock 
skew estimated by monitoring 300 packets using LPM 
remains consistent over time, we take 32 random samples, 
each of size 300 packets, from the trace and we estimate the 
clock skew for each sample. Fig. 2 shows the estimated 
clock skew as a function of the experiment number. We find 
that all the estimates remain very close to 51.25 ppm which 
is the actual estimate of the skew made over all the packets 
(shown by the dashed line in Fig. 2).
Thus, we can see that even using lower resolution time 
stamps (i.e., jiffies), we can estimate clock skews fairly 
accurately. However, we require 300 or more packets. In 
Section 5.2, we show that using higher resolution time 
stamp, we can estimate skews much faster.
We also examine the skew estimates for different APs 
based on the time measurement data collected at different 
machines. The skew estimate results based on data from 
four different machines are shown in Fig. 3. We note that 
the clock skew estimates differ across different measure­
ment nodes. This observation suggests that we must 
compare clock skews only from the same measuring node.
5.2 Results from the Residential Traces
In this section, we will refer to the Acer TravelMate 2303 
NLC laptop as laptopl and Acer Aspire laptop as laptop2. 
We use the monitor mode supported by the wireless cards 
in both the laptops for capturing beacon frames and also 
enable the Radiotap headers in the packets (as described in 
Section 4) that we capture.
First, we measure the clock skew of two different Linksys 
APs (Linksysl and Linksys2). The packets for this trace are 
collected using laptopl. Fig. 4 plots the offset-sets for the 
APs. Next, in order to study the consistency of the clock 
skews of different APs over time, we collect offset-sets from 
eight different APs (including Linksysl and Linksys2) in 
residential setting A on two different days while keeping all 
the other parameters (i.e., the time span of capture, etc.) 
same.4 Table 2 shows the skew estimates of all APs in 
residential setting A on two different days using LPM and 
LSF. As we did not have control over all the APs, 
manufacturer name is predicted based on the manufacturer 
specific first 3 bytes of the MAC address. The clock skew
4. We do not have any control over the amount of wireless traffic 






















sigcomm-nat-foye 40.30 40.39 34.99 35.29 44.91 45.00
sigcomm-public- 48.16 48.21 49.94
49.34
sigcomm-public- 48.82 48.90 32.59 32.62 42.69 42.98
Fig. 3. Skew estimates of different APs by chihuahua, Kalahari, Mojave, 
and Sonoran. All skew estimates are in part per million.
estimates measured in residential settings B and C are 
shown in Tables 3 and 4, respectively.
For all the three tables, we are able to estimate the clock 
skews accurately by analyzing 50-100 packets in most of the 
cases. Therefore, we find that microseconds resolution 
receiver time stamps that we use in our methodology result 
in a big improvement over millisecond resolution receiver 
time stamps that needed about 300 packets (or more for LSF) 
for accurate estimation of the clock skew (as shown in 
Section 5.1). This provides almost 20 times improvement over 
Kohno's results [9] where, on average, 1,000-2,000 packets 
were needed for a correct skew estimation. If we consider 
average time taken to estimate the skew, using higher 
precision time stamps in a more predictable WLAN setting 
takes only 2-3 minutes, whereas Kohno's clock skew 
estimates performed in a wide-area setting with coarser time 
stamps [9] take about 30 minutes-1 hour to converge. This 
makes our use of clock skew in the WLAN settings 15-20 times 
faster. We also make other important observations from these 
tables. First, clock skews are different for different APs. 
Second, the clock skew for a given AP is consistent over the 
two measurements. Third, clock skews obtained using LPM 
closely match those obtained using LSF.
5.3 Differentiating Frames of Fake APs
To simulate the attack scenarios where a fake AP and an 
authorized AP are active at the same time, we construct 
synthetic data sets by mixing beacon packets collected in real 
packet captures from multiple APs. While creating this data 
sets, we preserve the order in which the packets were received 
by the fingerprinter. As the fake AP and the authorized AP, 
both have the same MAC address, and the fingerprinter has 
no way of separating the packets. We analyze the effect of this 
intermingling on our estimation methods. We also test the
Fig. 4. TSF clock offset-sets for two different Linksys APs. Clock skew 
estimations are -64.23 and -45.69 ppm.
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TABLE 2
Clock Skew Estimates in Residential Setting A as Measured from laptop2
AP 1st Measure(LPM) 1st Measure(LSF) 2nd Measure(LPM) 2nd Measure(LSF)
Linksysl -64.23 ppm -64.10 ppm -64.90 ppm -64.77 ppm
Linksys2 -45.69 ppm -45.96ppm -46.94 ppm -46.71 ppm
Linksys3 -62.05 ppm -61.84 ppm -62.77 ppm -62.64 ppm
Belkin 1 -56.37 ppm -56.57 ppm -56.71 ppm -56.85 ppm
Belkin2 -1105.50 ppm -1105.69 ppm -1106.29 ppm -1106.06 ppm
Netgearl -58.08 ppm -57.78 ppm -58.86 ppm -59.25 ppm
Dlinkl -47.27 ppm -47.17 ppm -47.80 ppm -48.14 ppm
Unknown1 -40.91 ppm -40.99 ppm -41.61 ppm -41.47 ppm
efficiency of our algorithm for separating the packets using 
these synthetic data sets.
Table 5 shows that in some cases (e.g., cases 1, 2, and 4), 
the skew estimated using LPM is same as the skew of one of 
the APs whose packets are intermingled.5 These results 
suggest that when we use LPM, we might miss a fake AP 
operating at the same time as the authorized AP. This points 
to a serious problem in using LPM. On the contrary, the 
skews estimated by LSF are exceptionally large than the 
actual clock skews of each of the contributing AP. So, by just 
observing the skew value, we can conclude that some fake 
APs are active. Therefore, when using higher resolution 
receive time stamps LSF alone can be used to detect fake APs. 
However, if the receive time stamps are of low resolution, 
both LPM and LSF should be used. This is because LPM uses 
fewer packets than LSF to estimate the clock skew accurately. 
On the other hand, LSF detects the mixing of packets from 
different sources with a higher success rate than LPM.
We apply our packet separation algorithm (Algorithm 1), 
as described in Section 3, to all the five synthetic data sets 
that we use for Table 5 as well as to 10 other synthetic data 
sets created from traces collected by laptopl. Recall that 
Algorithm 1 requires a threshold that is used to differentiate 
between the jumps and the consistent increments of the 
clock offsets. We calculate this threshold using Algorithm 2 
for each data set. Once this threshold has been determined, 
we use Algorithm 1 to separate out the beacon packets of the 
fake APs from the ones sent by the authentic ones. We find 
that for all data sets, our algorithm accurately predicts the 
number of APs generating the data and correctly separates 
the offset-set corresponding to each AP. Algorithm 1 can 
also be used to separate packets in real time. Fig. 6 shows 
how the accuracy of separation increases with increase in 
the number of packets used to estimate the threshold. We 
observe that 75 packets are needed to estimate a threshold 
that achieves 99 percent accurate packet separation on 
average (over the five synthetic traces used in Table 5). 
These separated packets from the fake APs must be ignored 
by the wireless users. These packets can also be used to 
fingerprint the fake APs and determine their locations.
5.4 Impact of External Factors on Clock Skews
We now discuss the impact of external factors on clock skews.
5. In some cases (e.g., cases 3 and 5), LPM estimates the skew to be 0 ppm 
because some of the clock offset-set values become extremely large due to 
the intermingling of packets. As LPM tries to use the highest values in the 
clock offset-set to estimate clock skew, it finds that the differences between 
these large values are negligible compared to the values themselves. 
Therefore, in these cases, LPM approximates the clock skews as 0 ppm. An 
example is shown in Fig. 5.
5.4.1 Effect of Virtual APs on Clock Skew
Virtual APs use single wireless hardware to simulate 
multiple APs with different MAC Addresses, SSIDs, and 
BSSIDs. In this aspect, virtual APs are not much different
TABLE 3
Clock Skew Estimates (Using LPM) in 
Residential Setting B as Measured from laptopl
AP Clock Skew AP Clock Skew
Linksysl 22.53 ppm MeruNetworks 1 28.14 ppm
Linksys2 17.51 ppm MeruNetworks2 32.53 ppm
Unknown 31.66 ppm Trapeze Networks 1 23.66 ppm
Linksys3 20.67 ppm Trapeze Networks2 11.50 ppm
Linksys4 24.95 ppm Dlink2 30.50 ppm
Linksys5 23.54 ppm Linksys6 23.21 ppm
Unknown1 42.33 ppm Trendwar 34.28 ppm
Unknown2 36.22 ppm Dlink3 12.84 ppm
Unknown3 39.28 ppm Unknown5 35.5 ppm
DLinkl 30.85 ppm Linksys7 27.70 ppm
Unknown4 33.26 ppm
TABLE 4
Clock Skew Estimates (Using LPM) in 
Residential Setting C as Measured from laptop2
AP Clock Skew AP Clock Skew
Linksysl -42.01 ppm Apple 1 -33.35 ppm
Linksys2 -21.21 ppm Un known1 -34.56ppm
Linksys3 -35.16 ppm ActionTec 1 -32.77ppm
Linksys4 -28.04 ppm Microsoft 1 -7.93 ppm
Unknown4 -37.54 ppm Unknown2 -31.48 ppm
Unknown5 -46.34 ppm Unknown3 -36.08 ppm
4e+ll
^ 3e+ll 
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Fig. 5. LPM and LSF output using clock offset-set calculated from 
mixed beacon packets of three different APs (Case 5 in Table 5). 
The skew estimated by LPM is 0 ppm and LSF skew estimate is 
4,256,390,000 ppm.
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TABLE 5
Measure of Skew from the Synthetic Data Set
Case Data Sets mixed original skews skew(using LPM) skew(using LSF) Data sets estimated
1 2 62.05,62.47 62.47 4614750000 2
2 2 40.91,48.60 40.91 363843000 2
3 2 60.03,45.69 0 406340000 2
4 2 60.61,1106.31 1106.31 4729570 2
5 3 55.14,60.61,1106.31 0 4256390000 3
All skews are absolute values. Note that the skews estimated by LSF are extremely large because of the mixing which helps us to detect the
presence of fake APs much faster than LPM.
from virtual machines where multiple machines are 
simulated on the same hardware. However, from our 
experiments, we find that unlike the virtual machine clocks 
which normally have higher skew than real machines, as 
shown by Kohno et al. [9], all virtual APs being emulated on 
a particular hardware have the same clock skew, and the 
clock skew is in the same range as the real AP clock skews. 
This happens because while sending the time stamp, all 
virtual APs read from the same hardware timer and send 
the value unaltered. Virtual APs do not maintain separate 
virtual clocks. Therefore, all virtual APs using the real 
hardware clock will have the same clock skew as the real 
hardware clock. We test with five different APs (three 
Trapeze networks APs running their default firmware and 
two Linksys WRT54G APs running the DD-WRT firmware 
[23]). We simulate four virtual APs on each of the five real 
APs. Our results, as shown in Table 6, confirm the above 
argument. This implies that our methodology can also be 
used to distinguish virtual APs from real APs.
5.4.2 Effect of Temperature on Clock Skew 
It has been shown in existing work [9], [10] that under normal 
PC operating temperatures, the clock skew of a device 
remains constant within ±1 ppm. It has also been noted [10] 
that this temperature change can also occur due to varying 
processor load. However, Pasztor and Veitch [24] have 
shown that for small time periods (less than 1,000 seconds), 
the clock skew variance remains less than ±0.1 ppm. The 
results presented in another existing work [10] also support 
this observation as the change of clock skew due to 
temperature variance in their results occurs gradually. 
Therefore, in order to be able to track any changes in the 
clock skew of genuine APs and for detecting fake ones in the 
presence of clock skew variation with temperature, we 
propose using a "rolling signature" scheme described in 
Algorithm 3. We propose that an AP's clock skew must be
Fig. 6. Mean correct packet separation rate versus number of packets 
examined to estimate threshold.
updated to a new value if the difference between the new 
measured value and the old value is within a threshold. The 
nodes that measure clock skews (e.g., WIDS nodes) should 
collect packets from different APs and execute Algorithm 3 
over each 50-100 beacon frame block. Since collection of 
50-100 beacon frames typically takes much less than 1,000s, 
we can assume that the clock skew variance due to 
temperature will cause the consecutive clock skew estimates 
to differ only by approximately ±0.1 ppm rather than 
±1 ppm. This method thus enables our scheme to compare 
measured clock skews with a higher precision in comparison 
to the one used by Kohno et al. [9].
Algorithm 3. Fake AP detection algorithm 
Calculate new skew
if (newskew - currentskew) < max skew variance then 
currentskew newskew 
AP is original 
else
Fake AP detected, 
end if
As, we measure relative skew between two physical 
clocks, extrapolating the findings of [24], we can set max 
skew variance to ±0.2 ppm. In our high precision residential 
traces, when using the same fingerprinter, all but one pair of 
access points (Linksys5 and Trapeze Networks 1 in Table 3) 
differ by more than 0.2 ppm.
5.4.3 Effect of NTP Synchronization of Fingerprinter’s 
Clock on Skew Estimate
Unlike the approach used by Kohno et al. [9], we do not 
synchronize the fingerprinter's clock using the Network 
Time Protocol (NTP) or any other clock synchronization 
mechanism. Rather, we measure clock skew of an AP 
relative to the fingerprinter. Our measurement times are 
expected to be small (2-3 minutes) and the time stamps are 
measured in microseconds. NTPv4 is accurate within
10 milliseconds over the wide-area Internet and within 
200 microseconds over an LAN. The default minimum 
polling interval for NTP is 64 seconds [25]. However, in our
TABLE 6 
Skew of Virtual APs
AP Virt. API Virt. AP2 Virt. AP3 Virt. AP4
1 23.66 23.66 23.66 23.66
2 17.53 17.54 17.17 17.34
3 28.55 28.56 28.56 28.55
4 32.45 32.46 32.45 32.45
5 21.24 21.28 21.27 21.24
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TABLE 7
Comparison of Clock Skew Estimates of Same APs Measured 
from laptop2 Running on AC Power and Battery Power
AP Skew (AC power) Skew (battery power)
Linksysl -64.23 ppm 272.62 ppm
Linksys2 -45.69 ppm 254.10 ppm
The measurements were taken in residential setting A.
case, as the time stamps are measured in microseconds and 
the estimates of the clock skews are in the range of 100 ppm, 
enabling NTPv4 will not provide enough accuracy to make 
the clock skew estimates independent of the fingerprinter's 
own clock skew. However, in our problem definition, the 
fingerprinter (a WIDS node in a WLAN environment) 
remains the same. So, this dependence on the fingerprin­
ter's clock is not an issue in our scheme.
5.4.4 Selection of Fingerprinter’s Clock Source 
As mentioned earlier in Section 4, in a PC running Linux, 
gettimeofday system call provides microsecond resolution 
time stamps, gettimeofday internally uses PC's internal clock 
source to generate microsecond granularity time stamps. 
However, any modern PC normally has more than one clock 
source. The actual number and type of the clock sources 
depend on the particular model of the processor and the 
motherboard being used in the PC. The Linux kernel chooses 
the best available clock source in the PC for tracking time 
stamps that are reported by the gettimeofday system call. 
Some common clock sources are [26]—Programmable Inter­
val Timer (PIT), Time Stamp Counter (TSC), Advanced 
Configuration and Power Interface Power Management 
Timer (ACPI PMT), and High-Precision Event Timer (HPET).
As all these internal clock sources are physically different, 
they will have different clock skew. As described earlier, our 
estimates of the AP's clock skew are also dependent on the 
fingerprinter's clock skew. Therefore, while using time 
stamps from gettimeofday to measure clock skew of an 
AP, we must check whether the same clock source is being 
used by the kernel for all the measurements. The Linux 
kernel dynamically selects the most accurate clock source 
available as the internal clock source for the kernel. The 
accuracy of certain clock sources can change depending on 
different conditions. For example, in a particular device, 
TSC might be initially selected as the clock source for 
gettimeofday. However, after some time if that device 
switches to battery power from AC power, the Linux kernel 
will decrease the frequency of the processor (assuming that 
the processor supports frequency scaling that has been 
enabled) to save power. This will cause the TSC to go slower 
and might result in inconsistent time values. In this 
situation, the kernel will select some other clock source 
instead of TSC. Table 7 shows the change in clock skew 
estimates caused by the change of power source. To avoid 
these scenarios, for all our measurements, we use ACPI PMT 
clock source as this clock source is available in almost all 
modern laptops and its frequency does not get affected by 
external events including a switch to battery power.
6  Fabricat ion  o f  C lo ck  S kew s
Our approach to detect a malicious AP is based on the clock 
skew of the AP. As an AP broadcasts beacon packets, an
attacker can also listen to those packets, and then, calculate 
the relative clock skew of the AP with respect to its own 
clock skew. Using this clock skew estimate, an attacker can 
try to masquerade as the original AP by generating fake 
time stamps by adding proper offsets (those calculated from 
the measured skew) to its own time stamp. Let S denote the 
relative skew of the original AP as calculated by the 
attacker. Now the attacker can read its own time stamp T* 
and try to generate fake sequence of time stamps TFi using 
the following equation:
TFi = Ti + S*Ti. (8)
There can be two scenarios where an attacker can try to 
fake an original AP based on whether the original AP is 
active at the time of attack or not. If the attacker and the 
original AP are both active at the same time, the attacker's 
beacon frames will get mixed with the beacons sent by the 
original AP. As the attacker cannot control the time when 
the original AP sends its beacons, some of the beacons from 
the attacker might reach the receiver earlier than the 
beacons from the original one and some might reach later. 
As a result, the calculated skew will differ from the skew of 
the original AP (as shown in Table 5) and the attacker can 
be detected.6
Now, consider the scenario where only the attacker is 
active and it is fabricating time stamps by using the relative 
skew of the original AP that it calculated when the original 
AP was active. In order to test how accurately the attacker 
can fabricate time stamps, we examine systems that use the 
open-source MadWifi and Intel 3945ABG drivers. In these 
systems, channel sensing is done by the wireless hardware 
for the performance reasons. Furthermore, the time stamp 
in the beacon packets is set by the hardware when it 
actually transmits the packet. None of the wireless hard­
ware supported by these drivers allow the time stamp to be 
set by software. However, these drivers support a mode 
called the raw packet injection mode, where the drivers can 
transmit any byte stream as a link layer frame without any 
modification. Thus, an attacker can send beacon frames 
with forged time stamps using this mode. Even with this 
capability, an attacker cannot fabricate the original APs 
clocks skew as we explain below.
In an IEEE 802.11 wireless network medium access 
control, before sending any frame, the sender is required to 
sense the channel for any other ongoing communication. If 
the sender finds the channel to be idle for the Distributed 
Interframe Sequence (DIFS) duration, the sender delays its 
transmission by a number of random time slots. The length 
of each time slot is chosen from the interval [0, CW] (where 
CW is the contention window size). If the channel is still 
idle after the random delay, depending on configuration, 
either the sender does the Request to Send (RTS)/Clear to 
Send (CTS) handshake, and then, sends the data, or directly 
sends the data bypassing RTS/CTS handshake. These two 
random delays, waiting time for the medium to be free and 
random back off time before actual transmission, make the 
exact time between when a wireless frame is handed over to
6. Additionally, the sequence number of the received beacons will 
not increase monotonically as it should if only one AP is active as 
shown by [27],
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Fig. 7. TSF clock offset-sets for the original AP. Clock skew estimation 
for this AP is -178.83 ppm (using LPM).
Fig. 8. TSF clock offset-sets for the attacker with forged time stamps. 
Clock skew estimation is -35 ppm (using LPM).
the driver and when it is actually sent unpredictable. 
Therefore, the forged time stamp used by the attacker will 
not reflect the actual time of transmission, and thus, will not 
result in the same clock skew as that of the original AP.
To test the effectiveness of clock skew fabrication 
quantitatively, we first measure the clock skew of an AP 
from an attacker PC. The RTS/CTS mechanism is disabled. 
We also modify the rfakeap program [28] to send beacon 
packets with forged time stamps created by offsetting the 
attacker's time stamp with the skew of the original AP 
measured by the attacker. We shut down the original AP 
and run this modified rfakeap program on the attacker PC. 
We calculate the clock skew of the attacker PC based on the 
time stamps in the rfkeap beacons. We show the results of 
our clock skew calculations in Figs. 7 and 8. As expected, we 
see that the attacker's clock skew using forged time stamps 
differs significantly from the skew of the original AP.
One might be able to design a wireless card in the future 
that allows beacon time stamps to be directly set by software. 
We now argue that even when armed with such a wireless 
card, it will be hard for an attacker fabricating the clock skews 
to go undetected. In an IEEE 802.11 network, an AP schedules 
transmission of a beacon frame every beacon interval. The 
time instant at which an AP schedules transmission of a 
beacon is called the Target Beacon Transmission Time 
(TBTT). IEEE 802.11 defines time zero as a TBTT. The 
subsequent TBTT values are multiples of the beacon interval. 
Now, even though each beacon is scheduled to be sent at a 
TBTT, the actual time at which a beacon is transmitted 
depends on the time to process the beacon and the time to 
acquire the shared medium. The actual time at which the 
beacon is transmitted is included in the beacon. Therefore, 
based on the beacon number and the beacon interval and the 
actual time of beacon transmission, a receiver (e.g., a WIDS 
node) can determine the delay between scheduling a beacon 
and the actual transmission of the beacon. Let T denote this 
delay. Let Tb be the beacon processing delay and Tc be the 
contention delay in acquiring the wireless medium. Then, 
T = Tb + T( '. Note that in systems running the MadWifi and 
the Intel 3945ABG drivers, the beacon frames are prioritized 
over data frames. The beacon frames and the data frames 
have separate hardware queues. Thus, the number of data 
frames in the data queue has no impact on the actual beacon 
transmission time.
A WIDS node that observes a large number of beacon 
frames can find the minimum values of T. This minimum 
value corresponds to the situation where the medium
contention time Tc is minimum. Now, when an attacker 
armed with the capability to directly set beacon time stamps 
wishes to fake the clock skew of an AP, it must calculate the 
actual offset by performing a floating point multiplication 
and an addition/subtraction operation (as shown in (8)). 
These operations must be performed by the embedded 
processor in the wireless card which will increase the Tb 
value thereby increasing the minimum value of T. For the 
typical 150-250 MHz processors [29], Tb will increase at 
least by a few microseconds. This increase in the minimum 
value of T can be detected at the WIDS node. Currently, a 
special wireless card that allows beacons time stamps to be 
directly set by software does not exist. Hence, we cannot 
verify our argument in a real implementation.
7 Use  o f  C lock  S kew  in W ireless  A d Ho c  
Netw orks  to Identify Individual No d e s
In this section, we explore the possibility of using clock 
skews to uniquely identify different devices participating in 
a wireless ad hoc network. According to the IEEE 802.11 
protocol specifications, all nodes in an ad hoc network must 
broadcast beacon packets periodically containing time 
stamps according to their own clock. The time stamps in 
these beacon packets are meant for synchronizing the clocks 
of all nodes. Each participating device periodically syn­
chronizes its clock using the beacon time stamps it receives, 
by applying a clock synchronization algorithm that ensures 
the monotonicity of each node's clock. As mentioned in 
Section 6, in 802.11 infrastructure networks, beacons are 
only sent at TBTT. Similarly, in an IEEE 802.11 ad hoc 
network, to avoid collision while sending these beacon 
frames, each node waits for TBTT before attempting to send 
a beacon packet. At TBTT, each node backs off for a random 
amount of time before sending the beacon. During this 
random time interval, if a node detects any other node 
transmitting a beacon, it cancels its transmission. If a node 
does not detect any other node transmitting beacon packets 
during the entire random time interval, it sends its own 
beacon packet. After receiving a beacon packet, each node 
updates its clock according to Algorithm 4:
Algorithm 4. Beacon generation and Clock synchronization 
in IEEE 802.11 ad hoc networks 
At each TBTT calculate a random delay and wait for 
that period, 
if a beacon arrives within the delay then
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Fig. 9. Clock offset-sets calculated from beacon packets sent by two 
nodes participating in our ad hoc network. Clock skew estimates (214.89 
and 215.11 ppm) are very close due to fast synchronization.
if beacon's time stamp > local clock's time stamp then 




Send a beacon with local clock's time stamp 
end if
This algorithm ensures that over a period of time, the 
clock of each node will catch up to the fastest clock. This 
frequent synchronization makes it very difficult to estimate 
the accurate clock skew from beacon time stamps as all the 
clock skew estimates tend to be close to the clock skew of 
the fastest clock. To test the effect of the synchronization 
mechanism on our algorithms that we describe in earlier 
sections of this paper, we use a simple two-node IEEE 
802.11 wireless ad hoc network. We collect beacon frames 
sent by each of the two nodes at the other node. According 
to Algorithm 4, a node's clock will synchronize with the 
time stamps sent by the other node with the faster clock. 
Our two-node ad hoc network w ill result in a fast 
synchronization of the slower clock. In larger networks, 
all but the node with the slowest clock will synchronize 
slowly because for each of these nodes, there will be some 
slower nodes whose time stamps will be ignored by that 
particular node. Furthermore, in larger networks, the 
opportunities to transmit beacon packets might be missed 
due to higher wireless medium contention. We wish to 
study the effect of fast synchronization on our algorithms in 
order to understand their applicability in ad hoc settings. 
Our two-node testbed suffices for this purpose. Fig. 9 shows 
the effect of fast synchronization on our clock-skew-based 
scheme. We observer that the clock offset-sets of two nodes 
almost overlap each other. The estimated clock skews of the 
two nodes are thus very close to each other. This shows that 
in wireless ad hoc networks, it is very difficult to calculate 
accurate clock skews of participating nodes using beacon 
packet time stamps.
One of the possible ways to solve this problem is to 
collect time stamp samples from a node's clock more 
frequently. However, beacon packets are only sent after a 
beacon interval. If we decrease the beacon interval to 
increase the frequency of time stamp samples, the 
synchronization process will also become faster which will 
not help our cause. To address this problem, we explore the 
use of probe response packets instead of beacon packets, 
which also contain the same TSF timer time stamps as the 
beacon packets. However, unlike beacon packets, a node in 
an ad hoc network sends a probe response packet
Fig. 10. Clock offset-sets calculated from probe response packets sent 
by two nodes participating in our ad hoc network.
whenever it receives a probe request packet. Therefore, 
we can send probe request frames and can get time stamp 
values from the resulting probe response packets at a faster 
rate than using the beacon packets. However, we also note 
here that the fingerprinter's clock does not have unlimited 
accuracy. Therefore, if we send probe request packets too 
fast causing the probe response time stamps to be very 
close to each other, the estimated clock offset-set will not be 
accurate due to the errors caused by the measurement 
process. We test this phenomenon in our two-node ad hoc 
network by allowing probe requests to be sent by the two 
nodes as fast as the hardware and the medium allow. 
Fig. 10 shows the clock offsets we obtain from probe 
response packets. We find that the slower clock (i.e., the 
clock with lower clock skew) gets periodically synchro­
nized with the faster clock. However, the offset-set of the 
faster clock also shows irregularities unlike the offset-set 
calculated from the beacon packets. These irregularities are 
caused by the errors introduced by the limited accuracy of 
the measurement process as mentioned earlier. Our results 
show that probe requests should be sent at a rate that is low 
enough to minimize the measurement errors compared to 
the measured clock offset-set but high enough to generate 
enough probe response frames before the clock gets 
synchronized, to allow us to estimate the clock skew 
accurately.
In this paper, we only show the results from a two-node 
ad hoc network. However, for larger networks, with the 
increase in the number of nodes, we expect the synchroni­
zation interval for most of the nodes to increase due to the 
monotonic synchronization algorithm (Algorithm 4), and 
higher medium contention time. Therefore, in larger ad hoc 
networks, it might be possible to gather enough probe 
response packets from participating nodes to estimate their 
clock skews accurately before their clocks get synchronized. 
We plan to devise a practical algorithm to estimate a node's 
clock skew accurately in larger ad hoc networks in the 
future as an extension to our current work.
8 R elated  W o r k
For understanding the related work on detecting unauthor­
ized APs, we first distinguish between rogue APs and fake 
APs. A rogue AP is set up by some naive user for 
convenience and higher productivity [1], [2], [3], [4], If this 
AP's security is not carefully managed, this seemingly 
innocuous practice opens up the network to unauthorized 
wireless hosts, who can now become part of the network 
and launch different types of attacks. In contrast, a fake AP
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is set up by a malicious attacker to masquerade as an 
authorized AP. In this paper, we focus on fake APs. 
Currently, there are two main methods for detecting rogue 
APs—one that monitors wireless networks either manually 
or in an automated fashion by sniffing wireless frames to 
detect rogue APs based on MAC address, BSSID, and SSID- 
based filtering [1], [7], [3], [8], [4], [30], and the other that 
monitors IP traffic to differentiate wireless network access 
from wired access using interpacket delay patterns [31], 
[32], [33]. However, these approaches are ineffective in 
detecting fake APs mainly because all of the identity fields 
(e.g., MAC address) can be easily spoofed.
Bahl et al. [27] proposed a method to detect fake APs 
by monitoring the anomaly in the monotonicity of the 
"sequence number" field of beacon frames sent by the 
authorized AP and the fake AP which is masquerading as 
the authorized one. However, this method can only detect 
the presence of a fake access point; on the contrary, our 
scheme can detect and separate out packets from fake AP. 
Another serious drawback of this method is that it will 
only work if both the authorized AP and the fake AP are 
active at the same time. Bahl et al. [27] also suggested the 
use of a location detection algorithm to detect the fake AP 
if the authorized AP is inactive at the time of detection. 
The accuracy of this method depends on the accuracy of 
the location detection algorithm. If the fake AP operates at 
a location that is very close to the authorized AP's 
working location, then this location detection method will 
be ineffective. Our solution removes these constraints and 
detects unauthorized APs in realistic scenarios. Yin et al. 
proposed a method for detecting rogue APs that also act 
as layer 3 routers. However, this work is also vulnerable 
to MAC spoofing. Franklin et al. [34] introduced a 
technique to fingerprint wireless device drivers. However, 
an attacker can also use fake APs with the same wireless 
device drivers by choosing the same model and the same 
manufacturer as the original one to evade detection.
Our use of clock skew to fingerprint a remote device is 
not new. Kohno et al. [9] have already shown that clock 
skew can be used as a reliable fingerprint for a device. 
However, our contribution is significant because we apply 
the clock-skew-based fingerprinting to a scenario where the 
detections are much faster, accurate, and less vulnerable to 
spoofing attacks compared to Kohno's original scenario that 
uses TCP time stamps.
9 C o n clu sio n s  and  Future W o r k
In this paper, we explored the use of clock skews to detect 
unauthorized access points in wireless local area networks. 
We developed a methodology that benefits from higher 
precision time stamps and higher predictability in a local 
area setting. We evaluated this methodology using traces 
from the ACM Sigcomm 2004 conference and two different 
residence areas. We showed that our high-precision skew 
estimation is an order of magnitude faster and uses an 
order of magnitude less packets compared to the existing 
TCP-/ICMP-based techniques [9]. We also discussed and 
quantified the impact of various external factors including 
temperature variation, virtualization, and NTP synchroni­
zation on clock skew. We also explored the possibility of 
engineering clock skews to allow a fake AP to generate the 
clock skew of the original one. Our exploration results
indicate that the use of clock skews appears to be an 
efficient and robust method for detecting fake APs in 
WLANs. We also used our clock-skew-based fingerprinting 
technique in wireless ad hoc setting to identify individual 
nodes and showed that it is more difficult to estimate a 
node's clock skew accurately due to periodic clock 
synchronization among the nodes. As part of future work, 
we plan to devise a practical algorithm to estimate a node's 
clock skew accurately in ad hoc wireless networks where 
the number of participating nodes is large enough to slow 
down the clock synchronization process. Our solution 
addresses the problem of detecting fake APs effectively, 
but the general problem of finding a noncrypto method to 
detect MAC address spoofing by any wireless host still 
remains an interesting open problem.
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